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REIMAGINING MERGER ANALYSIS TO INCLUDE INTENT
Marina Lao*
ABSTRACT
Applications of Section 7 of the Clayton Act have been deficient in
identifying and prohibiting anticompetitive mergers, particularly those
involving the acquisition of nascent competitors in digital markets. While the
language of the Clayton Act is flexible and broad, its implementation has
evolved into a narrow, economic-focused analysis that requires (or expects)
quantitative evidence to show competitive harm and establish a prima facie case.
This approach sets an unusually high bar for plaintiffs when the mergers involve
dynamic technology markets in which firms compete more on innovation than
on price, primarily because the preferred economic tools are not well equipped
to measure and predict innovation harms in the long run. The problems are
exacerbated when dominant firms acquire nascent competitors because the
potential competitive impact of their acquisition is inherently even more
uncertain and therefore the quantifiable metrics even less helpful.
This Article makes a case for reimagining merger analysis to include intent
to help satisfy the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and strengthen merger
enforcement. Insisting on, or strongly preferring, empirical data to demonstrate
effects of a proposed acquisition when that data is unavailable means that
merger law will fail in its core mission for at least certain types of mergers.
Therefore, the better approach is to be open to the use of other sources of
evidence, such as intent, to supplement standard economic evidence. This Article
explains why and how intent evidence can be probative in predicting effects,
particularly in the case of a dominant digital platform’s acquisition of a nascent
rival. To illustrate, this Article draws on the collection of emails and statements
made by Facebook’s executives relating to the company’s famous acquisitions
of Instagram and WhatsApp.
Though many courts and commentators today are dismissive of the value of
intent, integrating it into merger analysis would not require legislative action
because the relevant statutory language is broad and no major case has barred

*
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I thank Erik Hovenkamp, Christopher Leslie,
John Newman, and Charles Sullivan for their invaluable feedback on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the
thoughtful comments of attendees at the 2021 Antitrust Round Table at the University of California, Irvine and
the 2021 Thrower Symposium at the Emory University School of Law.
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its use. The Article concludes by addressing the main objections that critics have
raised about the use of intent evidence in antitrust analysis generally.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. merger law, Section 7 of the Clayton Act,1 is difficult to apply even
under ordinary circumstances. Its fundament goal is simple enough: to identify
and prohibit mergers and acquisitions that are likely to harm competition and
consumers without standing in the way of those that are beneficial or benign.2
However, attempting to achieve this objective has always been challenging
because it usually entails analyzing, ex ante, the future competitive impact of
any merger or acquisition.3 Moreover, while the statutory language of the
Clayton Act is flexible and broadly written,4 its interpretation and
implementation have evolved into a narrow, economic-focused approach that
seemingly requires (or expects) quantitative evidence and the use of statistical
tests, econometric analysis, and associated empirical methodologies to establish
competitive harm.5 This has increased the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs.
The problem is more pronounced where the mergers involve dynamic
technology markets in which firms compete more on innovation than on price.
In such cases, evaluating an acquisition’s dynamic, long-run effects is key to
predicting whether it would likely substantially harm competition and
consumers. But the usual economic tools on which antitrust is increasingly
dependent, while quite good for analyzing short-term price impacts, are much
less useful in predicting non-price, dynamic effects further out into the future.6
Moreover, courts (and, until recently, antitrust enforcers7) have chosen for
decades to err on the side of nonaction when there is uncertainty in the prediction

1

15 U.S.C. § 18.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (2010)
[hereinafter HMG], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf.
3
Since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was passed in 1976, companies intending to merge are required to file
premerger notifications with federal antitrust agencies if the acquisitions exceed a certain threshold. 15 USC
§ 18(a). This means that, except for smaller transactions that do not trigger Hart-Scott-Rodino filing, most
merger reviews and challenges occur premerger, and merger analysis is necessarily predictive.
4
15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting those acquisitions whose “effect . . . may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in any line of commerce in any section of the country).
5
See infra Part I.
6
See, e.g., Marina Lao, Erring on the Side of Antitrust Enforcement When in Doubt in Data-Driven
Mergers, in 1 DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, LIBER AMICORUM: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON THE BENCH 497, 519–
22 (Nicolas Charbit et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Lao, Erring on the Side of Enforcement].
7
With Lina Khan appointed as the new Chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Jonathan
Kanter as the head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the two federal antitrust agencies
are clearly changing course. Khan and Kanter are both strong critics of Big Tech. See David McCabe & Cecilia
Kang, Biden Names Lina Khan, a Big-Tech Critic, as F.T.C. Chair, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
06/15/technology/lina-khan-ftc.html (June 17, 2021); Lauren Feiner, Senate Confirms Big Tech Critic Jonathan
Kanter to Lead DOJ Antitrust Division, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/16/senateconfirms-jonathan-kanter-to-lead-doj-antitrust-division.html.
2
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of effects,8 and prediction, by definition, entails uncertainty. The combination
of these factors has resulted in the under-enforcement of the merger laws,
particularly in those markets where technology changes rapidly and any
lessening of competition is likely to be seen in innovation.9 Perhaps as a result,
in the past ten to fifteen years, the largest digital technology giants—Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—have boldly made over four hundred
acquisitions, many involving nascent competitors, largely unopposed by
antitrust enforcers.10
When the firm being acquired is a nascent competitor—that is, a potential
future competitor whose innovation, though unproven, could pose a serious
threat to an incumbent when the product is fully developed or evolved—the
difficulty in establishing the acquisition’s anticompetitive impact is further
enhanced for several reasons.11 First, because a nascent competitor, by
definition, is typically not a present direct competitor of the acquiring firm in
the firm’s core market, it is harder to show with quantifiable evidence that its
acquisition by the acquiring firm would substantially lessen competition.
Second, a nascent competitor’s product is often not fully developed when the
acquisition is announced; consequently, it is more difficult to reliably predict
whether the product, when fully developed, would substantially threaten the
acquiring firm and to determine whether the proposed merger should be
prohibited as anticompetitive. Third, the common expectation of courts today,
and even of the antitrust agencies themselves, is that quantitative evidence and

8
See generally John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2019)
(criticizing the pro-defendant position taken in antitrust, particularly in digital markets); Jonathan B. Baker,
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1
(2015) (criticizing the error cost analysis as it is currently applied in antitrust, which is overly concerned with
false positives and skews toward underenforcement of the antitrust laws); Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton,
The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go from Here?, 58 REV. INDUS. ORG. 81, 82 (2021) (observing
that “‘Chicago School’ thought has worked to persuade courts that ‘false negatives’ (i.e., under-deterrence and
insufficient interdiction of anticompetitive mergers) are less harmful to consumer welfare than are ‘false
positives’ (i.e., over-deterrence and excessive interdiction of potentially procompetitive mergers).”).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See JASON FURMAN, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE DIGITAL COMPETITION
EXPERT PANEL 91, § 3.44–3.46 (2019) [hereinafter Furman Report], https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web
.pdf; Nicolas Petit, Technology Giants, the “Moligopoly” Hypothesis and Holistic Competition: A Primer, 28–
29 (Oct. 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2856502); see also MAJORITY STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, app. at 405–50
(2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493519 (listing all the mergers and acquisitions made by the four dominant platforms of Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google).
11
See infra Part II.B.
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precise economic tools should be used.12 But quantitative evidence of potential
innovation effects—the type of effects typically implicated in a nascent
competitor acquisition—is usually unavailable, and empirical methods do not
work well for that purpose.
In this Article, I make a case for reimagining merger analysis to include
intent to help satisfy the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and strengthen merger
enforcement.13 If we insist on or strongly prefer empirical data or other
measurable evidence to demonstrate the effects of a proposed acquisition, but
that data is largely unavailable in some cases, then the merger law would fail in
its core mission for at least certain types of mergers. The better approach,
therefore, is to be open to the use of other sources of evidence—namely intent—
to supplement the standard economic analysis. Intent evidence has probative
value in predicting the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions and
therefore can play a useful role distinguishing between mergers that are likely
anticompetitive and those that are not.
The subjective statements of an acquiring firm’s executives expressing their
perceptions of their market, including how that market is likely to evolve and
who might pose a future competitive threat to it, would greatly help in a
comparative assessment of how a market would probably look in the future ,both
with and without the acquisition.14 This type of assessment is important in
determining whether the proposed acquisition is likely to substantially reduce
competition, as I will later illustrate through an examination of the subjective
statements of an acquiring firm’s executives in two cases.15
The inclusion of intent in analysis is not a panacea; additionally, there are
alternative ways to address the problems, some of which are identified in this

12
In the United States, antitrust enforcers have recently become bolder; in a case challenging Visa’s
proposed acquisition of a potential competitor, Plaid, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ explicitly included
references to intent in its complaint. Its theory was that the target, Plaid, could leverage its platform to compete
with Visa’s debit cards. The allegations in support of the claim included references to internal documents
showing that Visa viewed the acquisition as an “insurance policy” because if Plaid developed its competing
payment platform, then “Visa may be forced to accept lower margins or not have a competitive offering.”
Complaint at 1–2, 5, United States v. Visa, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-07810 (N.D. Ca. Nov. 5, 2020). The parties
abandoned the transaction soon after the DOJ sued. See Brent Kendall, AnnaMaria Andriotis & Peter Rudegeair,
Visa Abandons Planned Acquisition of Plaid After DOJ Challenge, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2021, 8:06 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-abandons-planned-acquisition-of-plaid-after-doj-challenge-11610486569.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See infra Part III.B.2 & III.B.3 (discussing Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp,
respectively).
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Article.16 For example, Senator Amy Klobuchar and other co-sponsors have
recently introduced a bill, The Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, that
takes aim at the four largest technology platforms—Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google—by prohibiting them from making any acquisition unless they can
demonstrate the target is neither a rival nor potential rival and also demonstrate
the acquisition would not likely help enhance or maintain the platform’s market
position.17 Also, Senator Klobuchar had earlier introduced another bill, The
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Act, that would shift the burden to
the merging parties to show a merger is pro-competitive—as opposed to the
plaintiff proving that it is anticompetitive—for certain categories of mergers.18
In this case, the inherent difficulties of proof would fall on the merging parties,
rather than the plaintiff.19 Final passage of complex bills, however, is often
uncertain. What’s more, assuming the first-mentioned bill is passed in its current
form, it is expected to apply only to Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google,20
leaving unaddressed the limitations of the merger law as it is ordinarily applied
to others, including to acquisitions by large pharmaceutical companies and by
other technology heavyweights. Therefore, a discussion of any changes that
might be needed—short of legislation—remains helpful on the issue of
strengthening merger enforcement.

16
For example, one could, by legislation, completely ban all mergers and acquisitions over a certain value
threshold. See Robert H. Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan, Ban All Big Mergers. Period., ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/ban-all-big-mergers/618131/. Such a proposition could,
however, be overbroad in that it would cover efficient and otherwise beneficial transactions as well.
17
See S. 3197, 117th Cong. §§ 2(b), 2(b)(A)–(D) (2021); News Release from Amy Klobuchar, Sen.
Klobuchar, Cotton Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect Competition and Consumer Choice Online (Nov.
5, 2021) (available at https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=6DD6F99CC71B-4299-B96D-9A744263297D). This is a companion bill to an identically named House bill, the Platform
Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, that the House advanced in June 2021. See H.R. 3826, 117th Cong.
(2021).
18
See generally H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021) (creating a general ban on certain mergers with limited
exceptions).
19
See S. 225, 117th Cong., at (4) (2021). This bill would prohibit mergers that “create an appreciable risk
of materially lessening competition, or to tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony.” Id. § 2(b). It would also
shift the burden to the merging parties to show a merger is pro-competitive if (1) the acquiring firm has more
than fifty percent market share; (2) the acquisition eliminates a maverick; (3) the transaction is valued over $5
billion; or (4) the acquiring firm is valued over $100 billion and makes an acquisition valued over $50 million.
See id. §§ (2)(A), (4)(B), (5)(B)(i), (5)(B)(ii)(I)–(II).
20
One of the many criticisms of the House antitrust package is that the proposed legislation, in practice,
seems to be targeted at four specific companies—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—and is to be applied
only to those companies declared to be a “covered platform.” See Christopher Cole, Hotly Debated Tech
Antitrust Reforms Clear House Committee, LAW360 (June 24, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1397459?scroll=1&related=1. The criteria listed for a covered platform are those that seem to be satisfied by
only those four platforms. See id.
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Integrating intent into merger analysis should not require legislative action.
Although courts have come to expect plaintiffs to rely principally on quantitative
evidence and economic methodologies in merger cases, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act itself is broadly written and no major case has mandated such a narrow
approach.21 Rather, the treatment of intent as irrelevant to antitrust simply
became the “norm” as the discipline grew increasingly economic-oriented,
leading many to view intent evidence as too subjective and unreliable.22 While
I view the specific concerns raised as overstated, I also propose ways in this
Article to minimize these concerns.23
In Part I, this Article discusses the general difficulty in proving
anticompetitive mergers under current application of the existing merger law. In
Part II, it addresses the enhanced analytical problems when dominant firms
acquire nascent competitors, using Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and
WhatsApp as illustration. In Part III, this Article argues intent evidence has
probative value in merger analysis and its inclusion can strengthen merger
enforcement. Using the collection of emails and other statements from Facebook
executives relating to the company’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp,
this Article demonstrates how those statements could have given the agency
useful insights into the realities of Facebook’s core market, including how that
and related markets were expected to evolve. This information, had it been
considered, might have changed the agency’s decisions to clear those
acquisitions at that time.24 Finally, in Part IV, this Article addresses the major
objections raised by opponents of the use of intent and includes suggestions for
minimizing issues raised by these objections.
I.

DIFFICULTY IN PROVING ANTICOMPETITIVE MERGERS GENERALLY,
UNDER EXISTING APPROACH

The current approach to merger analysis sets a high bar, making it quite
difficult for antitrust enforcers to successfully bring action against
anticompetitive mergers even in ordinary settings. This difficulty does not stem
from the statutory language of the Clayton Act itself, which simply declares a
merger as anticompetitive if its “effect . . . may be to substantially lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”25 Rather, it is the evolution of the
Act’s implementation into its present highly technical and narrow approach that
21
22
23
24
25

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part IV (discussing why critics view subjective statements as unreliable).
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
15 U.S.C. § 18.
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has rendered the law difficult to apply.26 Current analysis increasingly insists on
quantification, simulated modeling, econometric studies, and other associated
expert methodologies to establish a prima facie case, all of which raise the
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and likely result in under-enforcement of the
merger law.27
The traditional approach to merger analysis typically begins by defining the
market and measuring market shares, which would then yield information on the
concentration of the relevant market and the extent to which a proposed merger
would increase that concentration.28 To the extent this exercise is primarily a
means to identify and prevent mergers that would make an already concentrated
market more concentrated, it is helpful for merger enforcement.29 In other words,
if it enables the use of the structural presumption articulated in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank,30 then the focus on market definition and market
share calculation serves an important function31 and is an effective tool.
One of the problems with the market definition exercise, however, is that it
has evolved into a rigid, threshold step that has taken on a life of its own.32 In
this form, plaintiffs must satisfy the threshold step before having the opportunity
to demonstrate a merger’s effects; cases are lost when the market is not
satisfactorily defined or market shares are not quantified and calculated to a

26
See, e.g., HMG, supra note 2, §§ 4.1–4.2 (articulating the hypothetical monopolist “SSNIP” test for
market definition; “critical loss analysis”); id. § 5.3 (defining the HHI test for measurement of market
concentration); id. §§ 6–6.1 (estimating “diversion ratio,” “value of diverted sales,” and “upward pricing
pressure”); id. § 2.1.2 (encouraging use of “natural experiment” evidence); id. § 6.1 (describing use of simulated
modeling).
27
See Salop & Morton, supra note 8, at 93 (noting that “without clarification, greater emphasis on
econometric evidence will lead to additional false negatives,” that “econometric techniques exist to address only
some competitive concerns but not others,” and that “[c]ompetitive concerns that lack econometric techniques
are no less important to consumer welfare than are others”).
28
See HMG, supra note 2, § 4. In this 2010 revised version of the HMG, the agencies have attempted to
diminish earlier emphasis on market definition by stressing agency analysis “need not start with market
definition.” Id.
29
See id.
30
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (“[A] merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715–16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying
structural presumption to establish a prima facie case).
31
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof,
127 YALE L.J. 1996, 1997 (2018) (suggesting increased reliance on structural presumption of Philadelphia
National Bank to strengthen merger enforcement).
32
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011) (describing the FTC’s
burden of identifying relevant market via market definition).
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court’s satisfaction, even if there is direct evidence of the merger’s potential (or
even actual) harmful effects.33
Market definition entails identifying and including all reasonable substitutes
available to a buyer for a seller’s product or services, usually by applying the
hyper-technical, hypothetical monopolist “SSNIP” test—in other words,
determining how buyers of the product at issue would respond to a “small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price.”34 In technology platform
markets where rivals compete more on innovation than on price, the SSNIP test
is not very helpful, particularly in two-sided markets where one side of the
market is “free.”35 Attempting to define a relevant product market by asking how
its users would respond to a SSNIP is obviously not meaningful when the
monetary price for the product is zero. Even assuming that a plausible market
definition is made out, demonstrating the merging firms’ market shares can be
incredibly difficult if a court, as it often does, expects total dollar sales or unit
sales to be the metric used for that task.36 That is because when a platform
charges zero price for its use and does not “sell” its product, there are naturally

33
See, e.g., id. at 1238 (affirming district court’s judgment for defendant based on finding that the FTC
failed to properly identify relevant product market to court’s satisfaction, despite clear evidence that prices of
the only two drugs in alleged product market were raised multifold after acquisition).
34
HMG, supra note 2, § 4.1.1.
35
Many of the most successful digital platforms are two-sided, or multi-sided. Their business models
involve developing and providing free or almost free online content or services (such as search, social media,
email, mapping) to attract consumers on one side of the platform. The platforms then monetize the users’
attention by “selling” their attention to advertisers on the other side, who pay the platform to serve advertising
to the users. See Lao, Erring on the Side of Enforcement, supra note 6, at 509–10 (discussing the business model
of advertisement-supported two-sided digital platforms, such as social media networks and search engines,
where the consumer-facing side of the platform is free for users). For an overview of antitrust analysis of multisided digital platform markets, see David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided
Platform Businesses, in 1 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 404, 404–05 (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
36
This, in fact, was the central rationale of a district court’s recent dismissal of the FTC’s antitrust
complaint against Facebook. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV 20-3590, 2021 WL
2643627, at *12–13 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021) (dismissing the FTC’s complaint against Facebook, with leave to
amend, finding that the government’s allegation of defendant’s market share in a monopolization claim was too
conclusory to plausibly establish market power). The court faulted the FTC for not even alleging what it was
measuring and said that, unlike a case involving a typical goods market, the court had nothing by which it could
infer how the agency arrived at its market share allegation. Id. at *13. The complaint against Facebook had
alleged monopolization, based in part on the theory that Facebook acquired Instagram and WhatsApp as part of
its strategy to maintain its dominance in the personal social networking market. Complaint for Injunctive and
Other Equitable Relief at 2–7, 23–39, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-03590, 2021 WL
2643627 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021). The FTC later filed an amended Complaint. See Amended Complaint for
Plaintiff, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-03590, 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. Aug. 19,
2021).
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no dollar sales (or unit sales) figures from which market shares can be
calculated.37
Even if the market-definition (and market-share-calculation) step in merger
analysis was eased,38 an excessive focus on quantitative evidence and special
empirical tests and studies39 is not always effective in identifying mergers that
are likely to harm consumers and competition. A merger is generally considered
harmful if it is likely to lead to higher prices, poorer quality, less consumer
choice, or less innovation.40 An effects analysis conducted using advanced
economic tools generally works reasonably well for ordinary goods that compete
primarily on price—for example, commercial baby food41 or office supplies42—
for there would be enough data and other information with which one could
calculate or predict the price or output impact of a proposed merger. But those
tools are not well equipped to focus on non-price competitive concerns in the
long run, particularly the implications on future innovation. That advanced
economic techniques do not exist for measuring certain competitive harms does
not mean, however, that those non-price harms do not exist or are unimportant.43
It should mean only that other types of evidence and more appropriate methods
of analysis, such as factoring in intent, are needed to supplement the usual
economic analysis.

37
In other words, in an ordinary goods market, such as a hypothetical commercial baby foods market, if
producer A’s total sales of baby food for the year was $10,000 and the total sales of all baby food sold in the
United States in that period was $100,000, producer A’s market share would be 10% ($10,000/$100,000). But if
a court requires the same metric to be used in the calculation of market shares of a digital platform that does not
charge a monetary price for its use, then it would not be possible to demonstrate that firm’s market share—there
are no total sales figures received from users in that market.
38
For example, in a case involving a digital platform market where the price to consumer is zero, a judge
can decide instead to accept other metrics, such as number of active users or total time spent on social media,
for the calculation of market shares.
39
See, e.g., HMG, supra note 2, § 2.1.2 (natural experiment evidence); id. § 6.1 (simulation models).
40
See, e.g., id. § 1 (“The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to
create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise. . . . A merger enhances market power if it
is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm
customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”).
41
See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co. & Minlot Holding Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (considering merger between manufacturers of baby food).
42
See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Staples, Inc. & Office Depot Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C.
1997) (considering merger between office products superstores).
43
Salop & Morton, supra note 8, at 93.
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II. ENHANCED ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WHEN DOMINANT FIRMS ACQUIRE
NASCENT COMPETITORS
The usual problems in a standard merger analysis are exacerbated when
dominant firms acquire a nascent competitor, because a nascent competitor, by
definition, is not yet fully developed and only promises future competition.44
Thus, the potential competitive impact of its acquisition by a dominant firm is
even more uncertain than usual. Furthermore, the quantifiable metrics that are
strongly favored in merger analysis, and in antitrust generally, are unsuitable for
evaluating non-price effects in the long run. At the same time, protecting nascent
competitors from removal from the market through acquisition by a dominant
firm is important because nascent competitors often hold the best promise of
introducing meaningful competition into markets that experience rapidly
changing technologies.45 In those markets, a future paradigm-shifting
innovation, more so than incremental or modest improvements of an
incumbent’s product by “clones,” is more likely to make a breakthrough in a
market with an entrenched incumbent with market power.46
A. Nascent Competitors and Why Their Protection Is Particularly Important
A nascent competitor typically refers to a promising firm that is not (yet) a
direct competitor in the incumbent’s core market and whose product, though
promising, is not fully developed or evolved.47 Whether a nascent competitor’s
potential threat to the incumbent materializes is necessarily somewhat uncertain
but, as the subsequent paragraph explains, its potency (should it materialize)
would be particularly significant in markets where the incumbent is protected by
strong network effects, as many major digital platform markets are. A market
44
There is no universal definition of “nascent competitor” but the term is commonly understood to mean
a potential future competitor who does not yet have a proven, fully developed product and may not directly
compete against the dominant firm in its core market. However, its product, when it has evolved or developed
to its full potential, holds the promise of disrupting the incumbent’s power. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu,
Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1883 (2020) (defining a nascent competitor as “a firm whose
innovation represents a serious, albeit not completely certain, future threat to an incumbent”).
45
See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 741 (2018) (observing
that preventing an incumbent with substantial durable market power from acquiring “smaller firms that, if left
to grow on their own, would become its strongest challengers” produces large payoffs).
46
See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 44, at 1886–87 (providing examples showing that “a significant
number of disruptive innovations—those that transform industry—have come out of very small firms with new
technologies unproven at the time” rather than from “big firms with large research laboratories”).
47
See, e.g., Tracy J. Penfield & Molly Pallman, Looking Ahead: Nascent Competitor Acquisition
Challenges in the “TechLash” Era, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2 (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/antitrust-magazine-online/2020/june-2020/jun20_penfield_6_17f.pdf (“A nascent competitor, as
distinct from a potential competitor, is a current competitor whose competitive presence is not fully actualized
but could develop into a significant head-on competitor of the acquirer.”).
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characterized by substantial network effects means that benefits to users increase
as the number of users increases.48 A social network, such as Facebook, is a
classic example of such a market.
In such markets, a new entrant must attain critical mass to succeed or even
survive, which leads to winner-takes-most markets and barriers to entry.49 This
effectively means that, after gaining dominance, an incumbent has little to fear
from “clones,” even those offering improved or additional features. A case in
point was the inability of Google’s social networking product, Google+, to gain
traction against Facebook despite Google’s formidable resources and technical
talent.50 In markets that benefit from strong network effects, therefore, any threat
to an incumbent is likely to come not from direct competitors within the market
(not even a heavyweight like Google) but from a firm whose prospective
innovation is potentially transformative, even if unproven and not fully
developed. Because nascent competitors may offer the only serious potential
challenge to an incumbent insulated from competition by network effects, their
protection by antitrust is particularly important if we value innovation and
competition. As will be discussed later, though Instagram and WhatsApp were
not Facebook’s direct competitors in the general social networking market when
they were acquired, they were potent nascent competitors in that they had their
own networks created around their products, which had popular features that
could potentially be leveraged into building a different type of social media
network to challenge Facebook.51
B. Why Current Merger Analysis Is Ineffective in Policing Dominant Firm
Acquisitions of Nascent Competitors
Merger analysis, which typically takes place premerger, is necessarily
predictive in nature. To decide whether the merger, if unchallenged, may
substantially reduce competition and harm consumers,52 the analysis must assess

48
See Catherine Tucker, Network Effects and Market Power: What Have We Learned in the Last
Decade?, ANTITRUST 72, 72 (2018) (“Economists use ‘network effects’ to describe contexts in which a good or
service offers increasing benefits the more users it has.”).
49
See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 164, §11.06
(2016) (discussing how network effects work in data-driven markets, which tend to offer zero-price products).
50
See Chris Welch, Google Begins Shutting Down Its Failed Google+ Social Network, VERGE (Apr. 2,
2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/2/18290637/google-plus-shutdown-consumer-personal-accountdelete.
51
See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
52
Bear in mind that Section 7 of the Clayton Act is prophylactic—that is, it is expected to bar mergers
when the trend toward lessening of competition is “still in its incipiency” and where there is simply a probable,
not definite, reduction of competition. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316–17 (1962).
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“what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will happen
if it does not.”53 Though not demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a
strong, and increasing, preference for quantitative evidence and the application
of econometrics, merger simulations, and the like in merger reviews.54
Economic concepts such as “diversion ratios,” “value of diverted sales,” “critical
loss analysis,” and “upward pricing pressure,” for example, pervade the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.55 Unfortunately, while these methodologies may
do a good job analyzing measurable competitive effects—such as price—and
predicting their prevalence, they are much less useful when the potential adverse
effects defy quantification and measurement.56 This, in turn, means that in
markets that experience rapid technological change, where the feared harm is
reduced innovation in the long run, current merger analysis has been ineffectual
in policing dominant firm acquisitions of nascent competitors.57 The inherent
difficulties can be seen, for example, in Facebook’s ability to acquire Instagram
and WhatsApp without facing any antitrust challenge.
1. Instagram Acquisition: How a Narrow Economic Effects Analysis Was
Likely Deficient
By way of background, Instagram was developed as a smartphone app that
allowed its users to easily edit and share photos taken on their smartphones via
its network.58 It emerged at an opportune moment when high-quality cameras
were fast becoming a regular feature on smartphones, smartphone use was
exploding, and consumers were increasingly migrating from desktop and laptop
computers to their smartphones for Internet access.59 Facebook, at that time, was
primarily designed for use on desktops and laptops, not smartphones.60
In 2012, to those outside the industry at least, photo sharing was not yet
considered a major part of the social media experience.61 On the consumer side
53
54
55
56

HMG, supra note 2, § 1.
See id. §§ 4.1.3, 6.1 (emphasizing economic concepts and tests).
See id.
See Jonathan B. Baker, Merger Simulation in an Administrative Context, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 451, 455

(2011).
57
This problem is widely understood. See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 46, at 1894; Terrell
McSweeney & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in Digital Markets—Looking Beyond
Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Feb. 2018, at 2.
58
For a discussion of Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram, see JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST
PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 161–63 (2019).
59
See Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 17.
60
Id. at 17–20 (detailing the threat to Facebook from the emergence of the mobile internet and alleging
Facebook struggled to make Facebook work well on mobile devices).
61
See Chris Sagers, How the Facebook Case Could Revitalize Our Broken Antitrust Law, SLATE (Dec.
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of the platform, Instagram did not look or operate like a social network as general
social networks were usually understood.62 On the advertising side, Instagram
sold digital advertisements to support the consumer side, like other digital
platforms that are free to consumers.63 But Instagram was only a small player in
the online display advertisement market.64
Under the prevailing analytical methods and considering only the types of
evidence that are generally considered relevant, one can see why neither U.S.
antitrust enforcers nor any other competition law authority challenged the
acquisition. They would have foreseen little competitive impact on the
advertising side of the market; in addition to Facebook, other major players
included Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft. The acquisition, therefore, was
unlikely to substantially affect the advertising customers.65 On the consumerfacing side, Instagram, primarily a photo-sharing service, was not seen as a
major existing competitor in Facebook’s core business as a general-purpose
social media network. Thus, unless the FTC was able and willing to go outside
the box and consider other indicia of effects, its choice to clear the merger was
understandable, if overly cautious.66

14, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/12/facebook-antitrust-law.html (“Facebook acquired
Instagram and WhatsApp during the early revolution in mobile technology, when photo sharing and messaging
weren’t yet really parts of the social media experience . . . .”).
62
While Instagram allowed its users to upload photos for sharing with others on the network, it was
essentially limited to that feature. It did not have other popular features associated with general, personal social
networks (e.g., Facebook and Google+), such as the ability to share articles, share their own thoughts and
opinions, post anything to their own timeline, enter into private chats with other friends who are online, and so
forth. See Mary Meisenzahl, Instagram Was Missing Some of its Most-Loved Features When it Launched in
2010–Here’s What it Looked Like Back Then, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2019, 8:18 AM). https://www.
businessinsider.com/instagram-app-how-it-looked-at-launch-2010-2019-11.
63
See D. Daniel Sokol and Jingyuan (Mary) Ma, Understanding Online Markets and Antitrust Analysis,
15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 46 (2017) (“[O]nline services are often available to users for free. Instead
of money, consumers provide attention and information that is often used to direct relevant advertising to those
consumers.”); William Antonelli, A Beginner’s Guide to Instagram, the Wildly Popular Photo-Sharing App with
Over a Billion Users, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-isinstagram-how-to-use-guide (“Instagram is a free social media platform for sharing photos and videos.”).
64
See BAKER, supra note 58, at 161–62 (detailing the U.K. Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) analysis). The
U.K.’s OFT, like the FTC, also cleared the transaction. Unlike the FTC, however, the OFT provided a detailed
explanation for its decision. The OFT found that Instagram was a small rival to Facebook in the online display
advertising market and, moreover, that Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft were already competing in that market.
Id.
65
See id. at 162.
66
It should be noted that the OFT did recognize that Instagram could have developed into a social network
but did not analyze this potential harm because it saw (1) Facebook as already facing credible competition from
Google+; and (2) the fact of Instagram’s rapid growth as demonstration that entry into social networking would
be easy. See id.
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As will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section, it is only when
one examines a trove of internal communications among Facebook’s senior
executives that a different judgment might have been reached.67 Had they been
considered, those candid communications would have clarified the potential
effects of the acquisition by providing a guide to understanding how and why a
competitive challenge to Facebook would likely come from Instagram.68 They
would have explained, in a way that no empirical analysis could, why Instagram,
not Google+, presented a threat to Facebook’s dominance, even though
Instagram (unlike Google+) was not perceived as a general-purpose social
network.69 The inability of the usual economic approach to consider these useful
insights in merger analysis highlights one of its weaknesses.
2. WhatsApp Acquisition: How a Narrow Economic Effects Analysis Was
Likely Deficient
The FTC’s clearance of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014
provides another illustration of the deficiency of the typical, narrow effects
analysis in the context of a nascent competitor acquisition. WhatsApp was an
independent text messaging app in a market with several messaging products,
including Apple’s popular iMessage for iPhones,70 WeChat, and Facebook’s
Messenger. Just as in the case of Instagram, at the time of the transaction, the
startup target did not directly compete against Facebook’s core business as a
social network provider.
If one were to look only at quantitative and other types of hard evidence that
antitrust finds probative, there was not much that could have supported a case
against the proposed acquisition. Like Instagram, WhatsApp neither looked like
a social network nor functioned like one.71 Thus, Facebook’s acquisition of
WhatsApp could not have been expected to substantially impact the social
network market. As for the text messaging market, while Facebook did offer a
text messaging product, that product—Messenger—was not a significant player
in a market where there were several important messaging providers besides

67

See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
69
See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
70
Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 34. Unlike Apple’s iMessage, WhatsApp can be
used on all major smartphone operating systems. Id.
71
See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining Instagram originally did not look or function like a social network as
social networks were understood).
68
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WhatsApp.72 Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp, therefore, could not have
been expected to significantly impact the text messaging market either.
Yet, as in the case of Instagram, internal communications among senior
Facebook management told a different story about the state of competition
facing Facebook. As perceived by those who would be in the best position to
know—Facebook management—WhatsApp had the potential to develop and
transform into a social media network, despite being no more than a text
messaging app at the time.73 In fact, the executives’ subjective statements74
revealed that Facebook’s fears over the potency of WhatsApp’s future potential
competition were so intense that it was willing to pay $19 billion, ten percent of
its market capitalization, to acquire the start-up.75 That the standard effects
analysis would ignore the relevance of such useful subjective statements
underscores the shortcomings of the customary approach.
III. A ROLE FOR INTENT EVIDENCE IN MERGER ANALYSIS
I argue here that we should reimagine merger analysis to include intent but,
first, there should be clarity in what is proposed. Specific intent is a required
element that must be proven only in criminal antitrust76 and attempted
monopolization77 cases, and I am not suggesting that it should be added as an
element that must be proven for other antitrust claims.78 Rather, my contention
is that subjective intent has probative value in other antitrust cases, including
mergers, and can be very useful in helping to distinguish between mergers (or

72

See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 6–7.
Id. (quoting Facebook executives’ concern that mobile messaging apps like WhatsApp “would enter
the personal social networking market, either by adding personal social networking features or by launching a
spinoff personal social networking app”); id. (citing Zuckerberg’s email, which identified a trend of “messaging
apps . . . using messages as a springboard to build more general mobile social networks”).
74
See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
75
See Robert Hof, In One Chart, Here’s Why Facebook is Blowing $19 Billion on WhatsApp, FORBES
(Feb. 19, 2014, 6:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/02/19/in-one-chart-heres-why-facebook-isblowing-19-billion-on-whatsapp/?sh=1a0ed0233d62. In fact, the size of the purchase price can be viewed as an
intent metric.
76
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 443 (1978) (maintaining that “a defendant’s
state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense” and concluding that “the criminal offenses
defined by the Sherman Act should be construed as including intent as an element”); id. at 436 n.13 (stating that
the holding does not change the general rule that civil antitrust violations do not require proof of specific intent).
77
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (holding that liability for attempted
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act requires “proof of a dangerous probability that they would
monopolize a particular market and specific intent to monopolize”).
78
See generally Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 659 (2001)
(arguing that specific intent should be a required element of a monopolization offense and that the evidence of
such specific intent must be objective).
73
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conduct) that are anticompetitive and those that are either pro-competitive or
neutral.
Though many jurists and antitrust scholars today are dismissive of intent and
object to its use in antitrust cases,79 courts have, in fact, historically recognized
the relevance of an antitrust defendant’s intent in explaining ambiguous conduct
and interpreting effects in cases under the Sherman Act.80 This recognition,
however, did not appear to extend to merger cases under the Clayton Act. Intent
evidence fell out of favor in antitrust generally as various measurement and other
economic tools improved and as antitrust became increasingly influenced by
neoclassical economic theory.81
I have, in previous writings, sought to reclaim a role for intent evidence in
monopolization cases, arguing that it complements economic analysis.82
Economic tools alone cannot always reliably determine the competitive effect
of any alleged exclusionary conduct.83 An intent inquiry could aid in an
economic analysis because subjective statements can provide clues about
ambiguous strategies and interpret their competitive effects.84 In this Article, I
argue that intent evidence is probative in merger analysis as well and that its use
could strengthen merger enforcement. Drawing on statements and other
documents produced in connection with the Facebook, Instagram, and
WhatsApp acquisitions, I examine how consideration of those subjective
statements could and should have made a difference in the FTC’s review of those
two acquisitions.

79
See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
151, 152–53 (2004).
80
See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Lao, supra note 79, at
161–64 (citing and discussing other cases).
81
See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 807 (2012) (attributing the
objection to intent evidence in civil antitrust cases to “[j]urists and scholars oriented by neo-classical economic
theory”); Lao, supra note 79, at 196–97 (tracing the diminishment of the role of intent evidence to the rise to
prominence of the Chicago School); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of
Business, 52 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 283, 315 (2001) (“In the wake of the Chicago School onslaught, intent
evidence in all areas of antitrust analysis has been devalued . . . .”).
82
See generally Lao, supra note 79, at 196–97 (explaining how intent evidence can serve as a helpful
additional tool in monopolization analysis); Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and
“Sacrifice,” 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2005) [hereinafter Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko] (explaining that an
economic effects analysis is generally inadequate on its own).
83
See Lao, supra note 79, at 178–81.
84
Id. at 196–98; Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko, supra note 82, at 190–99.
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A. Relevance of Intent Historically
If we were to focus primarily on pronouncements made in commentaries and
some cases, intent evidence would seem to have little relevance in contemporary
antitrust analysis. Judge Frank Easterbrook famously declared in A.A. Poultry
Farms v. Rose Acre Farms85 that “[i]ntent does not help to separate competition
from attempted monopolization”86 and “[t]raipsing through the warehouses of
business in search of misleading evidence both increases the costs of litigation
and reduces the accuracy of decisions.”87 He further said that “the evidence
offered to show intent will be even more ambiguous than the economic data it
seeks to illuminate.”88
Judge Richard Posner was equally dismissive of intent evidence, observing
that “[w]e attach rather little weight to internal company documents used to
show anticompetitive intent because, though they sometimes dazzle a jury, they
cast only a dim light on what ought to be the central question in an antitrust case:
actual or probable anticompetitive effect.”89 In California Dental Association v.
Federal Trade Commission, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise
described most intent evidence as being of “no value” and referred to analyses
of intent as being a “relatively fruitless inquiry” in antitrust rule of reason
cases.90
The same distrust and skepticism toward intent evidence is also reflected in
antitrust scholarship.91 The leading antitrust treatise, for example, states that
“bad intent is easily proven but seldom serves to distinguish situations where the
defendant’s conduct deserves condemnation from those in which it should be

85

881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1402.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 595–96 (7th Cir. 1984).
90
224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (deferring to district court’s discretion to require more than just
opinion and intent evidence); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 270 n.14 (8th Cir.
1995) (summarily rejecting opinion and intent evidence).
91
Some scholars do recognize that intent evidence is relevant in antitrust. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney,
Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 877–79 (2004)
(criticizing several courts’ summary rejection of opinion and intent evidence without evaluation of their
probative value); Lao, supra note 79, at 152–53; Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko, supra note 82, at 174 (stating
that both objective and subjective intent evidence are relevant considerations for the fact finder); Stucke, supra
note 81, at 807 (addressing the relevancy of intent evidence); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate
Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587, 632 (1982) (“Antitrust law
would profit were [intent evidence] returned to its historical role.”); Waller, supra note 81, at 315 (noting with
disapproval the devaluation of intent evidence in antitrust analysis).
86
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left alone.”92 Other scholars have made similar arguments, contending that
“[f]rom an economic perspective, which focuses on effects, an emphasis on
intent seems misplaced”93 and that the use of “hot” documents expressing
intentions and motivations may result in a substantial likelihood of error.94
Despite the rhetoric and strong language surrounding some of the critiques,
however, history shows that courts, in fact, have considered intent evidence in
earlier Sherman Act cases where the conduct in question was ambiguous and its
competitive effects unclear. In his famous formulation of the rule of reason in
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,95 Justice Louis Brandeis expressly
included intent as one of many factors to be considered under the test, “not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.”96 While intent evidence was not determinative of
liability, older antitrust cases tended to value it because both the conduct itself
and the effects may be unclear,97 and there are generally two competing stories
that could be told in any case—an anticompetitive one and a pro-competitive or
neutral one. The defendant’s intent, gleaned from testimony or documents, could
help the fact finder choose between the two.
As antitrust turned increasingly to hard metrics to answer key questions of
liability, however, the role of intent evidence in antitrust analysis became greatly
diminished. Even so, a careful examination of a few important modern
monopolization cases, most notably United States v. Microsoft,98 shows that
92
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 5, ¶ 601 (3d ed. 2006); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1039 (2000) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Monopolization Offense] (arguing that intent is not helpful because “the ‘intent’ to create a monopoly
anticompetitively cannot be distinguished from the intent to do so competitively”).
93
Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations or Missed Opportunities in
United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1042, 1092 (2001).
94
See Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The Use and
Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 610 (2005)
(condemning reliance on business documents in antitrust litigation).
95
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (describing the test for which the legality of a trade agreement or regulation
may be determined).
96
Id.; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75–77 (1911) (speaking of the
defendant’s “intent and purpose” to maintain dominance in the oil industry “with the purpose of excluding
others”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (stating that the power to exclude
competitors coupled with “the intent and purpose to exercise that power” was sufficient to find a monopolization
violation); Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense, supra note 92, at 1037–38 (noting and criticizing the historical
role of intent in monopolization cases).
97
See Lao, supra note 79, at 164 (arguing, in the context of monopolization claims, that knowing a
defendant’s intent can help explain ambiguous conduct and effects).
98
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (affirming
the District Court’s finding of liability for monopolization).
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some courts continue to consider intent evidence relevant and probative. In
Microsoft, the core allegation against the company was that it perceived a future
threat to its Windows operating systems monopoly from Netscape’s browser and
proceeded to engage in conduct to remove that threat.99 Bear in mind that
Netscape’s browser was not an operating system.100 Nor were its capabilities
developed to a point where it could provide some of an operating system’s
critical functions.101 Moreover, it was uncertain that, but for Microsoft’s
interference, Netscape would have ultimately reached that stage of
development.102
Thus, even though there was ample evidence that Microsoft did act to block
the efficient distribution of Netscape’s browser, it would have been difficult for
the court to find liability based on the economic evidence and usual metrics.103
Yet the court did find liability, evidently having considered and given weight to
intent evidence—the many subjective statements of Bill Gates and other
Microsoft executives.104 Both the opinions of the court of appeals and the district
court were replete with references to Microsoft’s anticompetitive intent.105 They
pointed to numerous internal corporate documents, senior executive statements,
and email exchanges among senior Microsoft corporate executives expressing
their fears that Netscape posed a substantial future threat to its Windows
monopoly and their intention to remove that threat by obstructing Netscape.106
I have argued in previous writings that intent evidence was pivotal in both
the district court and the D.C. Circuit’s Microsoft decisions, though the courts’
reliance on it was not explicit.107 The courts’ willingness to rely on those
statements, albeit not expressly, to support the finding of a violation shows that

99
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29–30 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing in detail the
government’s main theory of the case); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 53–54 (assessing the threat of Netscape’s browser
to Microsoft’s Windows monopoly, as Microsoft perceived it).
100
See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 53 (explaining “middleware” in relation to operating systems).
101
See id. at 53–54 (affirming the district court’s findings that Netscape’s software was not
interchangeable with Windows).
102
See Lao, supra note 79, at 184–87 (discussing the Microsoft case).
103
See id.
104
See id. at 208–09.
105
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76 (stating that “Microsoft documents . . . indicate that Microsoft’s ultimate
objective was to thwart Java’s threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in the market for operating systems”); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29, 51–52, 61 (D.D.C. 1999).
106
For a fuller discussion of intent evidence to explain effects in Microsoft, see Lao, supra note 79, at
153–54, 189.
107
Id. at 153–54.
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some courts remain open to the reliance on subjective statements in
monopolization cases, despite much rhetoric to the contrary.108
It is true, however, that most judicial considerations of intent have occurred
in the context of Sherman Act cases in determining liability in Section 1 rule of
reason cases and in Section 2 monopolization cases.109 In the analysis of mergers
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, there have been few references to motive
and intent. To the extent that intent evidence has come into play in merger cases,
it has been limited to assisting with market definition, with courts relying
partially on business documents or internal communications indicating whom
the merging parties considered to be their competitors.110 For example, in United
States v. H&R Block, Inc., which involved a proposed merger between two of
the three major companies that produce digital do-it-yourself tax software,111 the
court relied primarily on the merging parties’ documents to find that the relevant
product market was limited to “digital do-it-yourself tax preparation products”
(or “DDIY”).112 The court found that those documents showed the parties only
viewed the other’s DDIY product and Turbo Tax, the leading product, as the
competition.113 Further, the parties only tracked the DDIY products’ pricing and
marketing but were unconcerned with the possibility of competition stemming
from assisted tax preparation or manual tax preparation by taxpayers.114
Similarly, in Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc.,115 the court settled
the dispute between the FTC and the defendants over the relevant product market
by referring to the defendants’ own business documents and other evidence of
intent.116 If the market were defined narrowly as consumable office supplies sold
by office superstores, the market would have been extremely concentrated and
the merger between the top two would obviously be anticompetitive.117
108

Id.
See id. at 154 (discussing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985),
and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), where judicial consideration of intent
occurred in the context of the Sherman Act).
110
See, e.g., United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 52 (D.D.C. 2011); Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073, 1076 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cardinal Health,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that the relevant product market consisted of drug
wholesalers only, since the merging parties documents showed that they considered only other drug wholesalers
to be their competitors).
111
H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
112
Id. at 52–54.
113
Id. at 52–53.
114
Id. at 53–55.
115
970 F. Supp. 1066.
116
See id. at 1079 (discussing defendants’ documents that revealed the parties only focused on competition
from other office supply superstores).
117
Id. at 1073–75.
109
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However, if the market were broadened to include consumable office supplies
sold by all retailers, the merging parties’ share of the market would have been
much smaller and the proposed merger of little concern.118 In accepting the
FTC’s narrower market definition, the court relied substantially on the merging
parties’ business documents and other intent manifestations that showed how the
defendants, two of the three U.S. office supply superstores, considered only each
other and OfficeMax, the third superstore, to be competitors.119 Notably, the
defendants showed concern when another office supply superstore entered their
geographic areas but not when a non-superstore retailer that also sold office
supplies, such as Walmart, entered.120
But aside from the occasional reliance on intent evidence to assist in market
definition,121 antitrust enforcers hardly ever rely on such evidence to support
predictions that the effects of a proposed merger would be harmful to
competition. This Article argues that intent evidence should also be allowed a
role in the evaluation of potential competitive effects, particularly when the
proposed acquisition target is a nascent competitor. Merger analysis, performed
premerger, necessarily requires prediction, and the economists’ measurement
tools are not suitable for predicting non-price effects in the long run.122
Therefore, evidence of the intentions and motivations of the dominant firm
making the acquisition can be particularly useful in shedding light on the issue.
B. How and Why Intent Evidence Would Help in Identifying Anticompetitive
Acquisitions of Nascent Competitors
The strong emphasis on quantitative evidence and expert application of
various econometric tests in merger analysis is not, in fact, mandated by the
Clayton Act. The statutory language itself is general and does not require any
precise or “scientific” method, or limit the type of evidence that may be
considered.123 But, over the decades, the antitrust enterprise has grown

118

Id.
Id. at 1079 (“In document after document, the parties refer to, discuss, and make business decisions
based upon the assumption that ‘competition’ refers to other office superstores only.”).
120
Id. at 1077–78.
121
Many other cases, however, reject the use of such documents in market definition. See Manne &
Williamson, supra note 94, at 644–45 (discussing such cases).
122
See JAMES MANCINI, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., CONSIDERING NON-PRICE EFFECTS IN MERGER
CONTROL 5 (2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2018)2/en/pdf (“[E]xamples of [non-price]
effects playing a central role, and the availability of structured analytical tools to assess non-price effects, are
limited.”).
123
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting simply those acquisitions whose “effect . . . may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in any line of commerce in any section of the country).
119
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increasingly technocratic and dependent on rigorous economic tools to
demonstrate the potential competitive effects of a merger.124 While those tools
are fine for mergers in markets where the expected competitive impact is on
prices, they are far less capable of forecasting whether and how much a merger
or acquisition might reduce innovation or adversely affect other non-price
factors.125 As discussed, these inherent limitations are more debilitating where
the firm to be acquired is a nascent competitor. In such cases, a combination of
greater uncertainty, a seeming institutional preference for quantitative evidence,
and a tendency for courts to err in favor of defendants when in doubt126 has
discouraged antitrust challenges. An approach that has made it practically
impossible to prohibit any dominant firm acquisition of nascent competitors
clearly needs rethinking.
Of course, legislative reform that would either impose an outright ban on
acquisitions by certain firms and or shift the burden of proof onto the merging
parties for certain categories of mergers and acquisitions would greatly change
the conversation, at least with respect to the firms and the types of mergers that
are covered.127 But passing comprehensive legislation that makes fundamental
changes to existing law is typically difficult, and passage of the antitrust reform
bills that have been introduced by Senator Klobuchar or the House Judiciary
Committee is far from certain. Short of legislation or regulation, taking intent
evidence into account to supplement economic analysis could make a difference
and strengthen merger enforcement.
1. Intent Evidence Is Probative in Predicting Competitive Effects
As discussed previously, empirical data or other measurable evidence
comparing, ex ante, the market with and without the merger—particularly with
respect to innovation—is largely unavailable when a dominant firm proposes to
acquire a nascent competitor.128 Thus, if only that type of evidence were deemed

124

See supra Part I.
While the HMG does not commit the antitrust agencies to relying only on quantitative evidence or
various economic techniques in merger reviews (and ultimately to prove a violation), emphasis on the use of
these empirical tests and techniques pervades the Guidelines, and most examples provided within involve
analysis of price and other quantitative data. See generally HMG, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that the Guidelines
generally discuss analysis of mergers in terms of price effects).
126
See Baker, supra note 8, at 2 (criticizing the error cost analysis as currently applied in antitrust, which
is biased against antitrust enforcement); Lao, Erring on the Side of Enforcement, supra note 6, at 524–27 (making
the case that there should be less concern about the costs of false positives and more concern about false
negatives in merger analysis).
127
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
128
See supra Part II.
125
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relevant and probative in an effects analysis, distinguishing between
anticompetitive and pro-competitive mergers could be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. In many cases, though, there will be subjective statements made by
the company’s senior management relating to the transaction and, in every case,
business documents justifying the merger or acquisition to the acquiring firm’s
board of directors. These statements and documents can serve as a helpful guide
to decision-makers who must assess the proposed acquisition’s future effects on
competition and make a judgment on the ultimate question of whether the
acquisition is anticompetitive.
Making an intelligent judgment on the effects of a nascent competitor
acquisition requires having knowledge of the state of future competition in the
market in question, including how that market may evolve and whether (and
how) the acquisition target is likely to develop into a strong challenge to the
acquiring firm if it remains independent or is acquired by someone other than
the dominant firm. But courts and antitrust enforcers typically do not have
sufficient information or the expertise to answer these core questions.
Considering the subjective statements of the acquiring firm’s executives
effectively enables government decision-makers, be they courts or antitrust
enforcers, to draw on the expertise of those with knowledge—the company’s top
management.
The acquiring firm’s perceptions of the market and their competition are
relevant pieces of evidence because it is reasonable to assume that firms
understand better than anyone else the market in which they operate, how that
market may be transformed over time, and where their strongest competitive
threats lie. Assume, for example, that senior managers of dominant Firm A
express concerns, through emails or other documents, that start-up Firm B may
become a strong future challenge to its dominance, even though Firm B does not
yet have a fully developed product and is not an existing direct competitor. In
that scenario, the statements are probative in the evaluation of the future
competitive effects of the acquisition because they are likely the informed
assessments of those with expertise. Indeed, these statements should be assigned
greater weight if they are reinforced by consistent objective evidence, such as
an acquisition price that is so high that it makes no sense from an economic
perspective absent a premium for foreclosing competition.
Dismissing intent evidence as insufficiently rigorous129 and requiring
quantitative evidence to establish effects is bound to result in the under129

See, e.g., David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP.
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enforcement of the merger laws when quantitative evidence is unavailable or
difficult to generate. A better approach, and one that is more consistent with the
high-level goals of the merger law, would be to use intent evidence as a helpful
additional tool to complement economic analysis. Subjective statements of
company executives revealing their perceptions of whether and how a nascent
competitor may become a competitive force if it were to remain independent can
enable courts and antitrust enforcers to understand how a market may look in
the future with and without the acquisition. Subjective statements by senior
managers can also open a window to the acquiring firm’s true reasons for the
proposed acquisition, whether it is to foreclose future competition and protect
its dominance, which would be harmful, or to create synergies or improve on a
product, which would be beneficial to consumers. That, in turn, can help judges
and antitrust enforcers make better decisions and avoid false negatives.
How intent evidence might make a difference in merger reviews will be
explained more clearly below through an examination of the collection of
internal communications between Facebook’s executives in connection with the
company’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp several years ago.130 The
FTC did not challenge either acquisition at the time, probably believing that it
could not succeed under the prevailing methods of evaluating effects, which do
not consider intent evidence. Now, nearly a decade later and in the midst of a
huge backlash against Big Tech,131 the agency evidently regrets its decisions and
has filed a monopolization case against Facebook132 based primarily on
allegations that those acquisitions were part of the company’s strategy to
maintain its monopoly position in the personal social networking market.133 In
seeking divestiture of the two acquired companies as remedy, the FTC is
effectively seeking to unwind the acquisitions, implicitly admitting that it should
have taken action to prohibit the transactions at that time.134
L. 485, 514–16 (1999) (arguing that what one defines “as ‘the firm’s’ intention in the run of cases will probably
depend on who is asked, and even then the answer of one individual may not be worth much”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214 (2d ed. 2001) (“Any doctrine that relies on proof of intent is going to be applied
erratically at best.”).
130
See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
131
See supra note 7 (noting that both federal antitrust agencies are now headed by fierce critics of Big
Tech).
132
See supra note 36.
133
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 31, ¶ 105 (“In sum, Facebook’s
acquisition and control of Instagram represents the neutralization of a significant threat to [Facebook’s] personal
social networking monopoly, and the unlawful maintenance of that monopoly by means other than merits
competition.”); id. at 38, ¶ 127 (“In sum, Facebook’s acquisition and control of WhatsApp represents the
neutralization of a significant threat to [Facebook’s] personal social networking monopoly, and the unlawful
maintenance of that monopoly by means other than merits competition.”).
134
The district court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, for failure to sufficiently allege
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2. Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram: How Intent Evidence Might, and
Should, Have Made a Difference in the Agency’s Merger Review in 2012
Considering only quantitative evidence and the standard metrics the agency
customarily employs and that courts have come to expect, it would have been
difficult to establish to a court’s satisfaction that the acquisition of Instagram in
2012 would substantially harm competition on either the consumer or the
advertiser side of the social media platform. On the advertiser side, Instagram
was just a small player in the sale of online digital advertising space to
advertisers.135 It is well known that, in addition to Facebook, Google was a
dominant seller, as were Yahoo! and Microsoft.136 Thus, Facebook’s acquisition
of Instagram was unlikely to have much competitive impact on the advertiser
side of the market.
On the consumer-facing side, Instagram was primarily a photo-sharing app
in the early 2010s. Though sharing photos was (and is) one feature of social
networks, Instagram did not operate like a general-purpose social media network
with many features and functionalities.137 In other words, Instagram was not
viewed as Facebook’s direct competitor in providing general social networking
services. Thus, under the usual analytical approach, its proposed acquisition by
Facebook would be deemed to have negligible impact on competition on the
consumer-facing side of the market as well.
But this hard, quantitative evidence does not tell the full story. It alone does
not and cannot tell us whether an independent Instagram would likely develop
into a major threat to Facebook by leveraging its attractive features into building
a general social networking platform, perhaps launching a new social network
paradigm or model. But knowing the answers to that and other related questions
is important in the analysis of effects. Had the agency felt free to consider the
mounds of internal statements and communications among Facebook executives
and senior managers relating to those questions, it could and should have made
a different judgment on whether the acquisition would likely harm competition
and, hence, whether to approve or challenge the acquisition.

Facebook’s market power in the relevant market. Dismissal of Facebook Complaint, No. 20-CV-03590, 2021
WL 2643627, at *13 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021). The FTC filed an amended complaint on August 19, 2021.
Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, supra note 36.
135
See BAKER, supra note 58, at 162 (“Instagram was only a distant potential rival to Facebook in the area
of online display advertising. . . . Instagram was seen as poorly suited to challenge Facebook in its primary
advertising market, where, in any case, Facebook was already competing with Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft.”).
136
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
137
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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For example, the subjective statements included a 2012 email from Mark
Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder and executive, explaining that photo sharing
was a growing and “concerning trend.”138 In the same email, he worried that
Instagram “will evolve in the mobile world,” which he said would be “really
scary”; he further said that it was worth “paying a lot of money” for the startup.139 Following the same theme, Zuckerberg wrote to another Facebook
executive that “mobile app companies like Instagram . . . are building networks
that are competitive with [Facebook’s]” and that Facebook should be willing to
acquire them.140 Importantly, Zuckerberg recognized in that email that app
companies like Instagram “are nascent but the networks are established, . . . and
if they grow to a large scale they could be very disruptive” to Facebook.141
Through these and other internal communications, Zuckerberg and other
senior Facebook executives and managers voiced their concerns about future
competition from Instagram. They observed that photo sharing through mobile
apps was fast becoming a popular trend and expressed fears that Instagram could
pose a serious future threat to Facebook if it were able to independently achieve
scale. Zuckerberg repeatedly predicted that Instagram could achieve
considerable scale if it were to continue its growth, and repeatedly suggested
said that Facebook should acquire Instagram to deal with that risk.
It was evident from the collection of subjective statements that Facebook
viewed Instagram, though not a true social network, as a greater risk to
Facebook’s dominance as a social networking provider than Facebook “clones”
such as Google+.142 It believed that an independent Instagram could and would
expand, flourish, and evolve into a full-fledged personal social networking
product that could successfully challenge Facebook, in a way that even Google+
could not.143 These are not insights that a purely economic analysis, no matter
how “rigorous,” would have revealed.
Had the FTC turned to these statements to help predict effects, it would
essentially have been drawing on the expertise and greater knowledge of those
in the best position to know—Facebook executives and senior managers—to
learn how the acquisition would likely play out for consumers in the long run.
The statements would have helped the agency choose between two competing
138

Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
140
Id. at 26–27 (emphasis omitted).
141
Id. (emphasis omitted).
142
Id. at 3, 5 (“I remember your internal post about how Instagram was our threat and not Google+. You
were basically right.”).
143
Id.
139
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stories of every acquisition: an anticompetitive one (a merger will reduce or
eliminate present or future competition and allow the defendant to dominate the
market) and a pro-competitive one (a merger will facilitate innovation or new
product development, increase efficiency, and otherwise benefit consumers).
Knowing that key Facebook executives believed Instagram could and would
likely morph from a mere photo-sharing app into a general social network
equivalent, which could then disrupt Facebook’s dominance in social
networking, and that they urged acquiring the company to remove that risk,
should have informed antitrust enforcers that the anticompetitive story is the
more accurate one. That, in turn, could have and should have made a difference
in the agency’s decision on the acquisition at the time.
3. Facebook’s Acquisition of WhatsApp: How Intent Evidence Might, and
Should, Have Made a Difference in the Agency’s Merger Review in 2014
The approval of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014 is another
decision the FTC evidently regrets.144 WhatsApp was a mobile messaging app
that allowed smartphone users to send free, short text messages via the
internet.145 As the use of smartphones exploded in the 2010s, consumers’ use of
WhatsApp and other mobile messaging apps to communicate with one another
grew in popularity.146 However, these text messaging apps did not have features
that allowed users to engage in full-fledged social media networking. In other
words, WhatsApp was not generally viewed as a social media networking
platform and therefore not a competitor of Facebook in its core business.
Facebook’s concern, however, was that an independent WhatsApp could and
would build on its features to develop social networking functions and become
more of a substitute for Facebook’s core product.147 Unfortunately, quantitative
evidence of future innovation harms is typically unavailable and the usual
economic tools, though sufficiently advanced to predict competitive impacts on
price, are unable to effectively address the concerns presented by nascent
harms.148 But the lack of quantitative evidence or empirical methods to measure
and predict the prevalence of certain harms does not mean that no such harms
exist. Hard economic evidence alone cannot reliably assess the capability of

144

See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
See Charles Arthur, WhatsApp: The New Text Messaging, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2012, 9:44 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2012/dec/04/whatsapp-new-text-messaging.
146
See Hof, supra note 75 (explaining that mobile messaging service “is growing really, really fast,”
especially among young people).
147
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 6, 32–33.
148
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
145
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WhatsApp to develop into a future social media networking competitor of
Facebook. Nor can it predict the likelihood that it would do so. The FTC’s
apparent unwillingness to look to intent evidence, or perhaps its belief that it
could not do so, likely partially explains its 2014 decision to allow the
acquisition to proceed.
Here, as with the Instagram acquisition, there was an abundance of
subjective statements from Facebook’s senior management effectively detailing
the path that they feared WhatsApp could take to expand into the social media
networking space and disrupt Facebook’s dominance. For example, a senior
Facebook manager warned that mobile messaging “is a wedge into broader
social activity/sharing on mobile,” and described that as “scary.”149 A Facebook
scientist similarly predicted that mobile messaging apps could expand into
“domain[] that more closely resemble social-networking services.”150
Along the same lines, Mark Zuckerberg spoke of the trend of “messaging
apps . . . using messages as a springboard to build more general mobile social
networks.”151 Another email from a senior Facebook manager suggested that the
company did not fear Google+, Facebook’s direct competitor in the social
networking services market, but rather mobile messaging services.152 More
formally, a presentation made internally to the board of directors of the company
included warnings that mobile messaging services were “a threat to
[Facebook’s] core business . . . [and that] they have all the ingredients for
building a mobile-first social network.”153 Facebook’s additional concern about
WhatsApp was that, unlike Apple’s iMessage, it was not limited to mobile
devices of a single brand but was available on all major smartphone operating
systems, “positioning it as a credible threat to achieve significant cross-platform
scale.”154
In the aggregate, these subjective statements left little doubt that Facebook
insiders—who can be expected to have more much more information and
expertise than outsiders—believed that text messaging apps had the potential to
be built into social networking platforms and predicted that WhatsApp
specifically had the capability to do it. The executives, including Zuckerberg
himself, spoke numerous times of the threat this potential posed and of the need

149
150
151
152
153
154

Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 33.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
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to acquire WhatsApp, at a high price if necessary.155 Facebook eventually
purchased WhatsApp in 2014 for $19 billion, which represented ten percent of
Facebook’s market capitalization at that time.156
No quantitative data or sophisticated economic tools could have generated
the insights gleaned from these statements. The statements are valuable because,
in demonstrating the perceptions, motives, and purposes of Facebook in seeking
to acquire WhatsApp, they tell a more accurate story of the competitive realities
facing Facebook in its core business. They explain clearly why a start-up that
provided no more than mobile text messaging and had not yet turned a profit
nevertheless held the promise of introducing innovation and competition in
social networking.157 Had these statements been considered in the analysis of
effects, they could have changed the agency’s decision in the merger review.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF INTENT AND ADDRESSING THOSE OBJECTIONS
Fortunately, no legal impediment appears to stand in the way of considering
intent in merger analysis, or in antitrust analysis generally for that matter. The
language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not preclude its use; nor does the
Act even state a preference for quantitative evidence.158 Moreover, no Supreme
Court case has specifically held that intent evidence is inadmissible or has no
role to play in merger cases. Rather, objection to intent seems to have developed,
and hardened, as antitrust became increasingly technocratic, with heavy reliance
on economic data and economic experts to prove its cases.159 This Part of the
Article addresses a few major objections that have been raised, which all broadly
relate to the perceived unreliability of intent evidence and the accompanying
fear of adjudicatory error.
A. Unreliability
Because subjective intent cannot be easily quantified or measured, it is often
dismissed as unreliable and insufficiently rigorous to be considered in
contemporary antitrust analysis generally. Judge Richard Posner, for example,
has said that “[a]ny doctrine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied
155
See, e.g., id. at 37 (remarking immediately after the acquisition was announced that paying ten percent
of market cap was “worth it”).
156
See id. at 37; Hof, supra note 75.
157
See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 33–34.
158
See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
159
A district court recently dismissed the FTC’s complaint against Facebook alleging monopolization in
part because it was dissatisfied with the agency’s allegations regarding Facebook’s market share (and thus
market power). See Dismissal of Facebook Complaint, supra note 134, at *12.
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erratically at best.”160 Other scholars have similarly stated that “intent evidence
is generally inferior to objective evidence because competitive and
anticompetitive motivations are often indistinguishable.”161 Judge Frank
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, claims that
“[t]raipsing through the warehouses of business in search of misleading
evidence” not only is costly but also “reduces the accuracy of decisions.”162
Moreover, according to Easterbrook, “the evidence offered to prove intent will
be even more ambiguous than the economic data it seeks to illuminate.”163
Under this general unreliability umbrella lie a few more specific concerns,
including claims that (1) business executives making the statements may be
wrong in their predictions; (2) business executives tend to use loose language
that could be misconstrued for anticompetitive intent; and (3) the presence or
absence of intent evidence may be a function of luck and sophistication. Though
this Article views these objections as mostly overstated, it also offers
suggestions to mitigate the risks of unreliability.
1. Executives May Be Wrong
One argument that some have raised against the consideration of intent in
antitrust analysis generally is that corporate managers may not be well informed
and may have incorrect perceptions of the realities of the market.164 This
contention essentially rejects the common assumption that no one knows better
the realities and intricacies of a market than the market players themselves.
These critics argue, instead, that corporate managers “are limited in what they
do and what they can know, even if they behave as though they are fully
informed, fully capable actors.”165 Therefore, “taking their actions and words at
face value” would not provide a reliable basis for a decision-maker’s
conclusions.166 In other words, the argument is that the executives may be wrong
in their perceptions of the market and in their predictions on the state of future

160

POSNER, supra note 129.
Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1201 (1993).
162
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989).
163
Id.
164
Manne & Williamson, supra note 94, at 653 (“Corporate managers are limited in what they do and
what they can know, even if they behave as though they are fully informed, fully capable actors. The problem
with taking their actions and words at face value is that it does not present any way to distinguish between actual
and merely aspirational or simply wrong evidence of misconduct.”).
165
Id.
166
Id.
161
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competition; accordingly, reliance on their subjective statements to assess
competitive effects would yield erroneous results.
Presumably, in the context of the Facebook-Instagram and FacebookWhatsApp examples, the argument would probably go as follows: Facebook’s
executives may not have good information or full knowledge and could have
been overestimating the two start-ups’ abilities to expand into full-fledged social
networks. Or perhaps the Facebook executives responsible for the subjective
statements were paranoid and saw serious nascent threats where none existed.
To the extent that is true, the argument would likely continue that the many
emails reflecting the executives’ intent should not be treated as probative in an
effects analysis.
The argument that intent evidence is suspect because corporate executives
may be wrong and, therefore, their words and actions should not be taken at face
value to the corporation’s detriment is unusually pro-defendant. While corporate
managers are neither infallible nor all knowing, it is reasonable to assume that,
relative to generalist judges, antitrust enforcers, and other outsiders, they have
far more knowledge and expertise about competition in their markets. Therefore,
if corporate managers say that a start-up is a serious future threat that must be
acquired to neutralize said threat, then they should be believed as to their
intentions. It seems incredible to argue that such a statement should be treated
as irrelevant on the issue of competitive effects on the grounds that the executive
may be mistaken. Predictions, by their very nature, can turn out to be inaccurate
sometimes. But, on balance, given the importance of nascent competition to
innovation and the importance of innovation to society, erring on the side of
using intent evidence to complement economic analysis and strengthen merger
enforcement seems to be the right approach.
2. Misinterpretation of Subjective Statements
A more frequent objection that has been raised is the risk of misinterpretation
and misuse of subjective statements, which could then lead to the erroneous
condemnation of a transaction or conduct that is not, in fact, anticompetitive.167
The gist of this argument is that executives often use hyperbole and loose
language, which are prone to misinterpretation. Critics fear that if statements not
intended to be interpreted literally are taken at face value, then they could be
misconstrued as expressions of anticompetitive intent.168
167

POSNER, supra note 129; Cass & Hylton, supra note 78, at 676.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 129 (cautioning statements may reflect “a clumsy choice of words to
describe innocent behavior”).
168
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Alternatively, some argue that a manager’s statements should not be taken
at face value because those statements may have been precipitated by different
motivations.169 For example, the manager may have tailored the statement to
achieve another purpose, such as to gain internal support for an initiative they
wish to pursue.170 Stated differently, the argument is that a statement may not
truly reflect the speaker’s intent but was motivated by another agenda. To take
it at face value, then, would be a mistake and could result in erroneous decisions.
In my view, these objections are overstated. If Mark Zuckerberg said in an
email that “it is better to buy than compete,”171 it is not clear why fact finders or
decision-makers are not competent to make a judgment as to whether he meant
what he said, taking into consideration the context in which the statement was
made. Similarly, if Facebook executives acknowledged in an internal writing
that Instagram could leave Facebook “very behind in . . . how one of the core
uses of Facebook will evolve in the mobile world,” and that would be a “‘really
scary’ outcome for Facebook,”172 then it is again unclear why a decision-maker
would have unusual difficulty evaluating whether the statement should be
considered credible or dismissed as simply a poor choice of words, considering
the context in which the statement was made.
Assessing whether a particular statement is credible or has evidentiary
significance is the function of any fact finder or decision-maker. The notion that
intent evidence should be ignored as irrelevant because the speaker may not have
intended their expressions to be taken literally—either because they were just
“loose talk” or influenced by a desire to achieve other goals—seems somewhat
strange. In any case, the possibility of misinterpretation of subjective statements
is not unique to antitrust. Fact finders, be they judge or jury, or agency enforcers
reviewing investigatory facts, must routinely make judgments on the probative
value of any intent evidence in a variety of cases. And there is no reason to
believe that they are more vulnerable to being misled in antitrust investigations
and litigation than in other cases.173

169
See Manne & Williamson, supra note 94, at 652 (“[B]usiness actors are subject to numerous forces
that influence the rhetoric they use and the conclusions they draw. These factors include salesmanship; selfpromotion; the need to take credit for successes and deny responsibility for failures; the need to develop
consensus; and the desire to win support for an initiative or to neutralize its opponents.”).
170
Id.
171
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
172
Id. at 4–5.
173
Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko, supra note 82, at 204; Lao, supra note 79, at 207–08.
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3. Function of Luck and Sophistication
Another argument that some have made is that intent evidence has little
meaning because the presence or absence of bad intent is “often a function of
luck and of the defendant’s legal sophistication.”174 Judge Richard Posner stated
that firms well counseled on antitrust law “will not leave any documentary trail
of improper intent,” whereas firms without such counsel may find themselves
exposed due to their “clumsy choice of words to describe innocent behavior.”175
While there is certainly some (or substantial) truth to that statement, that should
not render the entire category of evidence unreliable or suspect. After all, this is
an argument that rings true not just in antitrust law but also in the many areas of
law where intent matters. Yet, few would seriously argue that, because there is
a bias in favor of those who have more resources and therefore receive better
legal advice, the entire system cannot be trusted. A better solution would be to
keep in mind that bias and make allowances or adjustments for it when assigning
weight to the evidence.
B. Minimizing the Unreliability Factor
Contending, as I do, that intent evidence should be afforded a role in merger
analysis is not equivalent to an argument that all subjective statements should
be assigned substantial probative value. To minimize the risk of misuse of
subjective statements, we can require that those statements carry certain indicia
of credibility before they are deemed to have probative value.176 These indicators
could include the absence of substantial contradictory evidence, the timing of
the statements in question, and the setting or circumstances in which the
statements were made. Additionally, the presence of corroboration by other
events could serve to boost the probative value of the subjective statements.
An absence of substantial contradictory evidence could be an indicator of
credibility of a subjective statement in that it suggests that the senior executive
or manager making the statement, for example, was not simply paranoid or
uninformed when they spoke of being “terrified” of the threat of a specific
nascent competitor. We should, therefore, be able to take them at their word
when they predict that the start-up would become a formidable challenger, and
when they speak of the need to buy that start-up, even at a high price, to
174
POSNER, supra note 129; see also Cass & Hylton, supra note 78, at 732 (reiterating Posner’s argument
that legally sophisticated firms will not leave any evidence of subjective intent while unsophisticated firms
would).
175
POSNER, supra note 129.
176
See Lao, supra note 79, at 210–11; Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko, supra note 82, at 205–06.
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neutralize that risk. In contrast, if a subjective statement is inconsistent with, or
is substantially contradicted by, other evidence, then the statement might be less
credible and should be given less weight so as to minimize the risk of
misinterpretation and misuse of the statement. That said, courts and antitrust
enforcers should be alert to the possibility that firms may then have an incentive
to create substantial contradictory evidence to neutralize a “hot” document.177
Yet another indicator of credibility could be the timing of the subjective
statements.178 If a subjective statement relating to the acquisition was made
within a reasonable time frame before the announcement, then it is likely to be
credible and could be given substantial weight. In contrast, statements made
about a nascent competitor and the reasons it should be acquired, made long
before any acquisition occurs, may be less credible and therefore less probative
as a prediction of effects.
The circumstances in which a statement was made also bear on its credibility
and probative value. If a subjective statement was made in a setting where a
“wrong” remark carries cost consequences, then the statement would bear the
mark of credibility and should be taken seriously as an expression of intent.179
For example, internal emails exchanged between a firm’s product development
and its mergers and acquisitions heads identifying a start-up as a serious future
threat, and discussing the need to acquire the start-up to neutralize the threat,
would be credible pieces of intent evidence because those making the statements
expect them to generate some reaction that carries cost consequences. Such
emails are unlikely to be off-the-cuff remarks that are unreliable indicators of
intent.
In contrast, subjective statements made in a context where “wrong” remarks
entail few cost consequences would probably be less reliable and less weight
should be attached to them. In that setting, the statements could, indeed, be loose
talk. For example, informal, unofficial email exchanges between the firm’s
coworkers regarding the same start-up could well be exaggerated remarks
because no cost consequences are expected to follow. Recipients or listeners of
the statements are unlikely, and not expected, to change course or otherwise
react to them in a way that entails costs. Concerns about the statement’s

177
See Christopher R. Leslie, How to Hide a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Denial, Deception, and
Destruction of Evidence, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1225–29 (2021) (discussing how price-fixing conspirators
falsify exculpatory documents); id. at 1219–25 (discussing how price-fixing conspirators hide and destroy
incriminating documents).
178
See Lao, supra note 79, at 210.
179
See id.
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reliability as an expression of corporate intent may then be justified, and those
statements should have less value as a guide to assessing an acquisition’s future
competitive effects.
Finally, if a subjective statement is corroborated or reinforced by other
events, its probative value should be enhanced. For example, the objective fact
that a firm paid the equivalent of ten percent of its market capitalization to
acquire a target that had not turned a profit, as Facebook did when it acquired
WhatsApp,180 is consistent with the various subjective statements of Facebook
managers181 and therefore increases their reliability factor. In short, so long as
subjective statements bear one or more of these indicia of credibility, they are
unlikely to be simply ill-considered or loose remarks with no probative value.
Rather, they could and should serve as a valuable tool in evaluating and
predicting the potential effects of an acquisition.
CONCLUSION
After decades of judicial and agency permissiveness in merger enforcement
(and in controlling monopolization), there is now major backlash against
increased concentration and dominant firm market power, particularly in the
digital markets. This Article has attributed lax enforcement in part to an
increasingly economic-focused analytical approach that is dependent on
quantitative evidence and the use of econometric and associated empirical tests
to establish anticompetitive harm. Unfortunately, this “rigorous” approach,
effective in predicting price effects in ordinary goods markets, does not work
well in evaluating mergers in dynamic technology markets where firms compete
more on innovation than on price. The difficulties are exacerbated when an
acquisition involves a nascent competitor because a nascent competitor’s future
impact, though promising, is generally more uncertain and the types of evidence
and analytical methodologies that are customarily preferred in antitrust are even
less useful.
This Article has argued for a role for intent evidence in merger analysis to
help strengthen merger enforcement. Intent evidence would complement
economic analysis because subjective statements of an acquiring firm’s senior
management can provide insights that can help interpret facts and predict effects,
as demonstrated by the collection of emails and statements made by Facebook’s
executives relating to the company’s famous acquisitions of Instagram and

180
181

See Sagers, supra note 61.
See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text.
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WhatsApp. The consideration of intent evidence does not require legislative
action, as it has never been forbidden in major cases, though some courts and
many commentators have dismissed its value. While critics have raised a few
issues that deserve some attention, these objections are overstated. In any case,
there are ways to minimize the risks of misuse of subjective statements, one of
the main objections that is raised. In short, intent evidence can be reliable and,
when used properly, reduce false negatives in merger cases.

